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DRAWING THE IRON CURTAIN: PRISONERS' RIGHTS




The landscape of prisoners' rights has undergone almost constant
change since the Supreme Court began to recognize that prisoners
maintain a "residuum of constitutionally protected liberty."' In June
1995, a divided Supreme Court2 in Sandin v. Conner again recon-
figured the analysis for determining when a prisoner has a protected
liberty interest entitling him or her to the procedural protections set
forth under the Fourteenth Amendment.3 Part I of this Note analyzes
the Court's prisoners' rights jurisprudence prior to Sandin. Part II of
the Note reviews the Court's decision in Sandin. Then Part III of the
Note examines and critiques the new standard set forth in Sandin.
I. HISTORY
A. Introduction
Prisoners' rights have evolved gradually over the last thirty-five
years. During this evolution, federal courts have struggled consist-
ently to strike the proper balance between the deference given to
prison administrators and the definition and recognition of prisoners'
* "There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this
country." Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460,.483 (1983) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
555-56 (1974)).
** 1997 J.D. Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law. I wish to thank Professor Sheldon
H. Nahmod for his guidance and support throughout the writing and editing process.
1. Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 466 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
2. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, which was joined by Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissent that was joined by
Justice Stevens. Also, Justice Breyer filed a dissent that Justice Souter joined. See Sandin v.
Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995).
3. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant part: "No State shall make or enforce
any law .. .; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .. " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
rights. 4 The Supreme Court has only added to this struggle by provid-
ing limited guidance and confusing standards to the lower courts.5
Prior to 1970, the courts, employing the "Hands-Off" doctrine,
generally abstained from interfering in prison affairs and declined the
opportunity to hear prisoners' claims. 6 The courts commonly justified
their approach on one of five rationales: (1) separation of powers; (2)
federalism; (3) judicial incompetence in prison administration; (4) fear
of undermining prison disciplinary schemes; and (5) desire to avoid a
flood of litigation.7 These five justifications, however, lost support as
the penal system failed to achieve its public protection, crime reduc-
tion, and offender rehabilitation objectives.8 This led the courts ini-
tially to reevaluate their approach toward prisoners' rights and
eventually to intervene at an increased pace in the administrative mat-
ters of the penal system.9
For example, in 1972, the Court began to extend procedural due
process rights to prisoners in Morrissey v. Brewer.10 In Morrissey, the
Court addressed whether the Due Process Clause requires that a state
afford a prisoner an opportunity to be heard prior to parole revoca-
tion. It concluded that "the liberty of a parolee, although indetermi-
nate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty, and its
termination inflicts a 'grievous loss' on the parolee."" The Court
4. See Barry R. Bell, Note, Prisoners' Rights, Institutional Needs, and the Burger Court, 72
VA. L. REV. 161, 162-63 (1986). The author identifies and discusses "three seemingly intractable
problems" faced by judges and commentators when faced with reconciling prisoners' rights and
deference to prison administrators. See id. at 163-464.
5. See id. at 166.
6. See id. at 162; Kenneth C. Haas, Judicial Politics and Correctional Reform: An Analysis
of the Decline of the "Hands-Off" Doctrine, 1977 DET. C.L. REV. 795, 796 (1977); Thomas 0.
Sargentich, Comment, Two Views of a Prisoner's Right to Due Process: Meachum v. Fano, 12
HARV. C.R.-C.L L. REV. 405, 405 (1977).
7. See Haas, supra note 6, at 797. The "Hands-Off" doctrine finds its origins in Ruffin v.
Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871), where the court concluded:
A convicted felon [is one] whom the law in its humanity punishes by confinement in the
penitentiary instead of with death.... For the time being, during his term of service in
the penitentiary, he is in a state of penal servitude to the State. He has, as a conse-
quence of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty, but all his personal rights except
those which the law in its humanity accords to him. He is for the time being the slave
of the State.
However, although the viability of the "Hands-Off" doctrine lasted throughout the 1960s, the
concept of the state-slave enunciated in Ruffin had started to deteriorate much earlier. See
Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944) ("A prisoner retains all the rights of an
ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him by law.").
8. See Haas, supra note 6, at 795.
9. See id.
10. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
11. Id. at 482.
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held, therefore, that the termination of parole requires orderly due
process, albeit informal.
12
In determining whether parole was a "liberty" interest entitled to
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Morrissey Court
framed the analysis not as a question of "merely the 'weight' of the
individual's interest, but whether the nature of the interest is one
within the contemplation of the 'liberty or property' language of the
Fourteenth Amendment."'1 3 The Court distinguished the conditions
of parole from those of confinement and recognized that "[t]he liberty
of a parolee enables him to do a wide range of things open to persons
who have never been convicted of any crime."'1 4 It further acknowl-
edged that a parolee relies on the implicit promise that parole will
only be revoked if the conditions of parole are violated.' 5
B. Development of the "Entitlement" Theory
The approach used by the Court in Morrissey proved to be
short-lived. The 1970s ushered in a new approach to property inter-
ests that would have immeasurable implications for the concept of lib-
erty in the context of prisoners' rights.16 Under the "entitlement"
theory, a state may create a property interest when it grants individual
benefits and restricts its own ability to rescind the grant. When such a
12. See id. The Court mandated a two-stage approach to parole revocation: a preliminary
hearing at the time of the arrest of the parolee and a final revocation hearing. See id. at 485-88.
The Court required that the preliminary hearing "be conducted at or reasonably near the place
of the alleged parole violation or arrest and as promptly as convenient after arrest while infor-
mation is fresh and sources are available." Id at 485. The purpose of the preliminary hearing is
"to determine whether there is probable cause or reasonable ground" to believe that a parole
violation has occurred. Id.
In addition, the Court outlined the minimum requirements of due process for the final revo-
cation hearing:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of
evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses
and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confron-
tation); (e) a "neutral and detached" hearing body such as a traditional parole board,
members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement
by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.
Id. at 489. The Court added that the inquiry is "narrow" and should not be equated to a criminal
prosecution. See id.
13. Id. at 481.
14. Id. at 482.
15. See id.
16. For an in-depth discussion of this approach, known as the "positivism" or "entitle-
ment" theory, see Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733 (1964). Also, for a
thorough analysis of the use of this approach with procedural due process rights of prisoners see
Susan N. Herman, The New Liberty: The Procedural Due Process Rights of Prisoners and Others
Under the Burger Court, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 482 (1984).
1997]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
property interest is created, the interest is protected by the Due Pro-
cess Clause.1
7
Literal interpretations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
are the foundation for the entitlement theory.18 Both amendments
provide that no person shall be deprived of "life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."'19 This procedural protection, however,
only extends to vested rights or "entitlements" in "life," "liberty," or
"property" interests.20 In the case of state-created interests, due pro-
cess protection applies "only if the state has made the interest a for-
mally protected 'entitlement.'"21
The Court first applied this theory in Goldberg v. Kelly, z2 where it
considered the question of "whether the Due Process Clause requires
that the recipient [of welfare benefits] be afforded an evidentiary
hearing before the termination of the benefits. '23 The Court con-
cluded that "only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing provides the
recipient with procedural due process." 24 It noted that welfare bene-
fits "are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to re-
ceive them, ' 25 and "[i]t may be realistic today to regard welfare
entitlements as more like 'property' than a 'gratuity.' ' '26 The Court
17. See Joseph P. Messina, Comment, Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson:
The Demise of Protected Liberty Interests Under the Due Process Clause, 17 NEW ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 233, 234 (1991).
18. See Rodney A. Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitu-
tional Law: The Price of Protesting Too Much, 35 STAN. L. REV. 69, 72 (1982).
19. The Fifth Amendment provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on
a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
20. See Smolla, supra note 18, at 72.
21. Id. at 72.
22. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
23. Id. at 260.
24. Id. at 264.
25. Id. at 262. "The [Goldberg] opinion, however, did not explain exactly why or how the
welfare statute in question created an entitlement." Herman, supra note 16, at 489.
26. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262 n.8.
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reasoned that the "extent to which procedural due process must be
afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be
'condemned to suffer grievous loss,' and depends upon whether the
recipient's interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental
interest .... -27
Two years later, in Board of Regents v. Roth,28 the entitlement
theory served as the impetus for a new method of constitutional analy-
sis by the Court.29 In Roth, David Roth, a nontenured university pro-
fessor, brought a suit alleging that the university's "decision not to
rehire him ... infringed his Fourteenth Amendment rights. '30 Roth
alleged that the university's failure to provide notice and a hearing
violated his right to procedural due process. 31
In deciding whether due process requirements applied, the Court
echoed the sentiments of the Morrissey Court and focused on "the
nature of the interest at stake," rather than the "weight" of the inter-
est.32 The first step in due process analysis, therefore, is to determine
whether the "interest is within the Fourteenth Amendment's protec-
tion of liberty and property. '33 Only after a court determines that a
constitutionally protected "liberty" or "property" interest has been
impaired does the inquiry move to the second step-the determina-
tion of what process is due.3n
Justice Stewart, the author of the majority opinion in Roth, de-
fined liberty expansively:
27. Id. at 262-63 (citation omitted). The Court, therefore, considered the weight of the
interest involved, but "did not clarify whether it was a sufficient factor in and of itself" to trigger
procedural due process protection. Herman, supra note 16, at 489.
28. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
29. See Herman, supra note 16, at 490-94.
30. 408 U.S. at 568.
31. See id. Roth also asserted that the university's true reason for failing to rehire him was
to punish him for critical statements that he had made about the university's administration, thus
in violation of his right to freedom of speech. See id.
32. See id. at 571. The Court noted that "[t]he requirements of procedural due process
apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protec-
tion of liberty and property." Id. at 569. However, the Court also warned that "the range of
interests protected by procedural due process is not infinite." Id. at 570.
33. Id. at 571.
34. It is in this second step that a court considers the "weight" of the interest. See id. at 570.
In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), the Court outlined the three factors that are
balanced or weighed in the second step of the analysis:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the prob-
able value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administra-
tive burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
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Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint
but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of
the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God ac-
cording to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized ... as essential to the orderly pur-
suit of happiness by free men.35
He then followed with a narrower definition of property:
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution.
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by ex-
isting rules or understandings that stem from an independent source
such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain bene-
fits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits. 36
The Court concluded that the principle of liberty was not an issue
in the case37 and that Roth "did not have a property interest sufficient
to require the University authorities to give him a hearing when they
declined to renew his contract of employment. ' 38
Roth explicitly bifurcated the procedural due process analysis and
rejected the notion that the "weight" of the interest alone could trig-
ger procedural due process protection. Thus, after Roth, an individual
could suffer a "grievous" loss and still not receive procedural due pro-
cess protection if the interest at stake did not meet the threshold defi-
nition of liberty or property.39 Moreover, Justice Stewart's positivist
definition of property provided a means for the Court to limit the role
of the federal judiciary in certain contexts, such as § 1983 and govern-
ment employee cases. 4o The Roth Court left it unclear whether a simi-
lar positivist definitional approach applied to liberty; a question
answered by the Court in Paul v. Davis.41
In Paul, the Court considered whether the defamation alleged by
Edward Davis stated a claim for relief under § 1983 or the Fourteenth
Amendment. The majority concluded that the interest in reputation
asserted in Paul was neither "liberty" nor "property" and was not en-
35. Roth, 408 U.S. at 572 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1976)).
36. Id. at 577. For a thorough analysis of the Court's discussion of "liberty" and "property"
in Roth, see Herman, supra note 16, at 492-94.
37. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 574.
38. Id. at 578. The Court reasoned:
Thus, the terms of the respondent's appointment secured absolutely no interest in
re-employment for the next year. They supported absolutely no possible claim of enti-
tlement to re-employment. Nor, significantly, was there any state statute or University
rule or policy that secured his interest in re-employment or that created any legitimate
claim to it.
Id.
39. See Herman, supra note 16, at 492.
40. See id. at 494.
41. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
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titled to due process protection.42 More important, Justice Rehn-
quist's majority opinion recognized the theoretical possibility that
state-created liberty interests exist.
43
Although Paul provided a theoretical basis for applying a positiv-
ist approach to "liberty" interests, the Court has had little opportunity
to do so. There are three primary reasons for this lack of opportunity:
(1) asserted liberty interests typically have a constitutional basis; (2)
the Court does not desire to clarify its definition of constitutionally
protected liberty; and (3) procedural due process claims usually do not
involve a "liberty" interest.44 Cases involving prisoners, however, rep-
resent one of the few instances where a procedural due process claim
implicates a "liberty" interest.45 Since the state has the acknowledged
power to deprive an individual of a freedom we might recognize as
"liberty" in the prison context, prisoner cases by their very nature
lend themselves to a positivist analysis of "liberty. '46
C. "Entitlement" Theory in Prisoners' Rights Cases
The first application of the entitlement theory to a prisoners'
rights case occurred in Wolff v. McDonnell.47 In Wolff, a class action
filed on behalf of inmates at a Nebraska prison alleged that "the rules,
practices, and procedures" of the prison that governed the taking of
"good time" credits violated the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.48 The Court concluded that although the Consti-
tution does not guarantee good-time credit for satisfactory behavior
while in prison, the State had "not only provided a statutory right to
good time but also specifie[d] that it is to be forfeited only for serious
misbehavior. ' 49 Since the state created the liberty interest and condi-
tioned its deprivation on a finding of major misconduct, the Court
42. See id. at 711.
43. See id. at 710-11. Justice Rehnquist stated:
It is apparent from our decisions that there exists a variety of interests which are diffi-
cult of definition but are nevertheless comprehended within the meaning of either "lib-
erty" or "property" as meant in the Due Process Clause. These interests attain this
constitutional status by virtue of the fact that they have been initially recognized and
protected by state law, and we have repeatedly ruled that the procedural guarantees of
the Fourteenth Amendment apply whenever the State seeks to remove or significantly
alter that protected status.
Id. (footnote omitted). For a general discussion of Rehnquist's opinion, see Herman, supra note
16, at 500-01.
44. See Herman, supra note 16, at 502.
45. See id. at 503.
46. See id. at 503.
47. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
48. Id. at 553.
49. d. at 557.
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held that "the prisoner's interest has real substance and is sufficiently
embraced within Fourteenth Amendment 'liberty"' to entitle him to
protection.50
The Wolff Court rooted its decision in the notion that a person's
state-created liberty interests merit the same protection as those cre-
ated directly by the Constitution.51 However, it reasoned that "there
must be mutual accommodation between institutional needs and
objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general
application."
5 2
The Morrissey and Wolff decisions exemplified the Court's expan-
sive view of the constitutional protections afforded to prisoners.
5 3
However, in Meachum v. Fano,54 the Court adopted a much more re-
strictive approach in defining prisoners' rights.55 The Meachum Court
addressed the question of "whether the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment entitles a state prisoner to a hearing when he
is transferred to a prison the conditions of which are substantially less
favorable to the prisoner, absent a state law or practice conditioning
50. Id.
51. Id. at 557-58.
52. Id. at 556.
53. See The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REV. 103, 107 (1983). Commentators
debated the effect Wolff had on the landscape of prisoners' rights. Some offered:
what, then, did Wolff accomplish? Although the majority opinion arguably reached
the right result, its rationale offered little guidance to the lower courts. The Court's
opposition to a detailed set of rules, which would invite litigation and impose a "consti-
tutional straitjacket," effectively ensured that prisoners would employ the broad ration-
ale of Wolff to challenge other practices. If good time revocations implicated a valid
liberty interest and evoked the balancing test, then the same argument could be made
when a prisoner was placed in isolation confinement or administrative segregation or
was transferred to another facility. How, short of either "hands off" or complete judi-
cial supervision, could the Court select an appropriate standard of review for effecting
its mutual accommodation?
Bell, supra note 4, at 171. While others argued:
Most courts understood Wolff to establish a general hearing requirement whenever a
disciplinary charge might lead to either of the two types of punishment considered,
regardless of the precise content of state law. Indeed, while the decision contained
some talk of state promises, the Court seemed almost as unconcerned with the lan-
guage and structure of state law as it had been in Morrissey. The Court was vague
about the source of its assertion that disciplinary confinement could be imposed only
on a finding of major misconduct, just as it had not revealed the source of the "implicit
promise" regarding the parole revocation in Morrissey. Wolffs dictum about good-
time credit being the creation of the state seemed rather irrelevant at the time, yet it
was this dictum, and not Wolffs moderately pro-prisoner holding, that set the tone for
subsequent case law.
Herman, supra note 16, at 508-09 (footnote omitted).
54. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).




such transfers on proof of serious misconduct or the occurrence of
other events."
'56
Prisoners in a Massachusetts prison had sought injunctive relief,
declaratory relief, and damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, after they had
been transferred by prison officials from a medium security prison to a
maximum security prison with "substantially less favorable condi-
tions." 57 After a two-and-one-half-month period of nine serious fires
at the prison, prison officials had ordered the transfers of the prisoners
thought to be responsible.5 8 The Court held that the Due Process
Clause does not protect a prisoner against transfer from one prison to
another prison within the state prison system.59 Although noting that
a "convicted felon does not forfeit all constitutional protections by
reason of his conviction and confinement," the Court reasoned that
the liberty interest sought to be protected in Meachum was not one
that "the courts must be alert to protect." 6
In distinguishing Meachum from Wolff, the Court contrasted the
liberty interest in each case. In Wolff, the liberty interest "had its
roots in state law," and the Due Process Clause required minimum
procedures "to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily ab-
rogated."'61 In Meachum, however, no Massachusetts law conferred a
"right on the prisoner to remain in the prison to which he was initially
assigned, defeasible only upon proof of specific acts of misconduct." 62
A fear of placing the Due Process Clause "astride the day-to-day
functioning of state prisons and involv[ing] the judiciary in issues and
discretionary decisions that are not the business of federal judges"
also guided the Court in its holding in Meachum. 63 The Court noted,
however, that the individual states could follow another course and
require pretransfer hearings "by statute, by rule or regulation, or by
interpretation of their own constitutions." 64 The Court concluded that
"Massachusetts prison officials have the discretion to transfer prison-
ers for any number of reasons" and that the discretion was not limited
to instances of serious misconduct.65
56. 427 U.S. at 216.
57. See id. at 217, 222.
58. See id. at 216.
59. See id. at 225.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 226 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974)).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 228-29.
64. Id. at 229.
65. Id. at 228.
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Meachum seems to add little to the analysis of prisoners' rights
cases on its face. It marked, however, a significant shift in the analysis
of prisoners' rights cases for two primary reasons. First, the Meachum
Court applied an extremely narrow entitlement analysis to the liberty
interest at issue.66 "This analysis confined the search for liberty to
rights specifically grounded on state laws, avoiding more inchoate and
less formal indications that a state recognized a claim of right. '67 Sec-
ond, in distinguishing Wolff, the Meachum Court focused on whether
the nature of the state action was mandatory or discretionary.68 This
dichotomy provided the framework for a different approach that re-
stricted prisoners' rights even more in defining state-created liberty
interests in future cases.69 Thus, if state regulations used the words
"shall," "will," or "must" when calling for state action, then the state
action would be considered mandatory.
For example, in Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and
Correctional Complex,70 the Court accepted the prisoners' argument
that a Nebraska parole statute created a legitimate expectation of re-
lease entitled to protection under the Due Process Clause. 71 The pris-
oners had filed "a class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that
they had been unconstitutionally denied parole by the Board of Pa-
role. '72 In particular, one of the claims brought by the prisoners
stated "that the statutes and the Board's procedures denied them pro-
cedural due process. '73 The challenged statutes established eligibility
for discretionary parole when the minimum term of imprisonment had
been served less good time credits. 74 Additionally, the statute pro-
vided that the Board of Parole "shall order" release of a prisoner un-
less one of four conditions applied.75
The Court focused on the prisoners' second argument that "the
statute creates a presumption that parole release will be granted, and
that this in turn creates a legitimate expectation of release absent the
requisite finding that one of the justifications for deferral exists. '76
66. See Sargentich, supra note 6, at 415.
67. Id.
68. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 228.
69. See Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2298 (1995).
70. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
71. Id. at 12.
72. Id. at 3-4.
73. Id. at 4.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 11.
76. 1l at 12. The Court rejected the prisoners' first argument that "a reasonable entitle-
ment is created whenever a state provides for the possibility of parole." Id. at 8-9.
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Although the Court eventually accepted this argument, it provided
conditional language.77 First, it noted that it interpreted the statute
without the benefit of the Nebraska courts' interpretation of the scope
of the interest the statute had intended for inmates. 78 Second, the
Court emphasized that the Nebraska statute had "unique structure
and language" and any analysis of other state statutes "must be de-
cided on a case-by-case basis."
'79
Despite the presence of a liberty interest entitled to protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment in Greenholtz, the Court eventu-
ally concluded that the procedures offered by the prison met the mini-
mum requirements of the Due Process Clause.80 Nonetheless, the
Greenholtz Court's approach to defining a liberty interest entitled to
protection provided an impetus to the Court in Hewitt v. Helms.81
The prisoner in Hewitt claimed that Pennsylvania prison officials'
actions confining him to administrative segregation within the prison
violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 82 The Court rejected the prisoner's assertion that the
administrative segregation involved an interest that was "indepen-
dently protected" by the Due Process Clause.83 However, the Court
concluded that the prisoner had "acquire[d] a protected liberty inter-
est in remaining in the general prison population" from the Penn-
sylvania statutes and regulations in question.84
77. See id. at 12.
78. See id.
79. Id.
80. Id at 16.
81. 459 U.S. 460 (1983).
82. Id. at 462.
83. See id. at 466-68.
84. Id. at 470-71. Section 95.104(b)(1) of Title 37 of the Pennsylvania Code provides that:
An inmate who has allegedly committed a Class I Misconduct may be placed in Close
or Maximum Administrative Custody upon approval of the officer in charge of the
institution, not routinely but based upon his assessment of the situation and the need
for control pending application of procedures under § 95.103 of this title.
37 PA. CODE § 95.104(b)(1) (1978). Section 95.103(b)(3) of the same title provides:
An inmate may be temporarily confined to Close or Maximum Administrative Custody
in an investigative status upon approval of the officer in charge of the institution where
it has been determined that there is a threat of a serious disturbance, or a serious threat
to the individual or others. The inmate shall be notified in writing as soon as possible
that he is under investigation and that he will receive a hearing if any disciplinary action
is being considered after the investigation is completed. An investigation shall begin
immediately to determine whether or not a behavior violation has occurred. If no be-
havior violation has occurred, the inmate must be released as soon as the reason for the
security concern has abated but in all cases within ten days.
Id. § 95.103(b)(3). Finally, a State Bureau of Correction Administrative Directive states that
when the State Police have been summoned to an institution:
Pending arrival of the State Police, the institutional representative shall: 1. Place all
suspects and resident witnesses or complainants in such custody, protective or other-
1997]
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The Court identified two sources from which liberty interests pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment may originate-the Due Pro-
cess Clause and the laws of the States. 85 In concluding that the Due
Process Clause itself did not "implicitly" create an interest in being
confined to a general population cell, the Court focused on the scope
of the authority of prison officials and the nature of the liberty inter-
ests prisoners retain.86 Since "broad discretionary authority" is essen-
tial for prison officials, the Court reasoned that allowing any
substantial deprivation imposed by prison officials to trigger proce-
dural protections of due process would place the courts in an area
reserved for prison administrators.8 7 Moreover, the Court recognized
that prisoners retain only "the most basic liberty interests." s Accord-
ingly, it failed to classify confinement to a general population cell as
one of these "basic liberty interests."8 9
The Court then moved its analysis to the Pennsylvania statutes
and regulations to determine if the state itself had created a liberty
interest. Although the Court rejected the prisoner's argument that
the very fact of Pennsylvania's creation of "a careful procedural struc-
ture to regulate the use of administrative segregation indicates the
existence of a protected liberty interest," it nonetheless concluded
that the prisoner had acquired a protected liberty interest in remain-
ing in the general population.90 The Court reasoned that Penn-
sylvania had "gone beyond simple procedural guidelines" and had
repeatedly used "explicitly mandatory language in connection with re-
quiring specific substantive predicates." 91 Although the Hewitt Court
eventually held that the process that had been offered to the prisoner
satisfied the minimum requirements of the Due Process Clause, the
case marked a significant shift in the determination of prisoners' lib-
erty interests. Hewitt and the cases that preceded it provided the
framework for the Court when it heard Sandin v. Conner.
wise, as may be necessary to maintain security. A hearing complying with [37 Pa. Code
§ 95.103] will be carried out after the investigation period. Such hearing shall be held
within four (4) days unless the investigation warrants delay and in that case as soon as
possible.
PA. ADMIN. DmECTVE BC-ADM 004, § IV(B) (1975).
85. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 466.
86. See id. at 466-67.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 467.
89. See id. at 467-68.
90. Id. at 470-72.
91. Id. at 471-72. Specified substantive predicates include, for example, "the need for con-
trol" and "the threat of a serious disturbance." I at 472.
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II. THE CASE: SANDIN V. CONNER
A. Factual Background
In August 1987, a prison officer at Halawa Correctional Facility, a
maximum security prison in Oahu, Hawaii, escorted DeMont Con-
ner92 from his cell to the module program area and subjected Conner
to a strip search, including an inspection of the rectal area.93 In re-
sponse, Conner directed angry and foul language at the officer.94 As a
result, he received notice eleven days later that he had been charged
with disciplinary infractions-" 'high misconduct' for using physical in-
terference to impair a correctional function, and 'low moderate mis-
conduct' for using abusive or obscene language and for harassing
employees." 95
On August 28, 1987, Conner appeared before an adjustment com-
mittee and requested that he be allowed to present witnesses at the
hearing.96 The committee rejected his request and "determined that
Conner was guilty of the alleged misconduct. '97 In addition, the com-
mittee "sentenced him to 30 days disciplinary segregation in the Spe-
cial Holding Unit for the physical obstruction charge, and four hours
segregation for each of the other two charges to be served concurrent
with the thirty days."98
Conner sought administrative review within fourteen days of re-
ceiving the committee's decision.99 Nine months later, the deputy ad-
ministrator expunged Conner's disciplinary record with respect to the
high misconduct charge because it was unsupported. 10° However,
92. Conner had been convicted of numerous state crimes, including murder, kidnapping,
robbery, and burglary and was serving an indeterminate sentence of thirty years to life, See
Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2295 (1995).
93. See id. at 2295-96.
94. See id. at 2296.
95. Id. Hawaii's prison regulations established a hierarchy of misconduct ranging from
"greatest misconduct," HAW. ADmiN. RuLE § 17-201-6(a) (1983), to "minor misconduct," id.
§ 17-201-10. Section 17-201-7 enumerated offenses punishable as "high misconduct" and set
available punishment for such offenses at disciplinary segregation up to thirty days or any sanc-
tion other than disciplinary segregation. Id. at § 17-201-7. Section 17-201-9 listed offenses pun-
ishable as "low moderate misconduct" and set punishment at disciplinary segregation up to four
hours in cell, monetary restitution, or any sanction other than disciplinary segregation. Id. at
§ 17-201-9. In addition to the levels of misconduct which classified various misdeeds, the regula-
tions also defined "serious misconduct" as "that which poses a threat to the safety, security or
welfare of the staff, other inmates or wards, or the institution and subjects the individual to the
imposition of serious penalties such as segregation for longer than four hours." Id. § 17-201-12.
Such misconduct was punished through adjustment committee procedures. See id.







before the deputy administrator had decided Conner's appeal, Conner
had filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Hawaii pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.101 Conner's complaint sought
injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and damages for, inter alia, "a dep-
rivation of procedural due process in connection with the disciplinary
hearing."'102 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the prison officials. 0 3
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court's judgment and concluded that Conner "had a liberty interest in
remaining free from disciplinary segregation."'04 In addition, the
court found that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Conner had received all of the due process to which he was
entitled. 105
B. The Court's Decision
1. The Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion directed lower courts
to focus their liberty interest inquiry on the "nature of the depriva-
tion" rather than "the language of a particular regulation."'1 06 To con-
centrate on regulatory language, Rehnquist posited, would be to
"encourage[ ] prisoners to comb regulations in search of mandatory
language on which to base entitlements to various state-conferred
benefits."'1 07 In addition, this approach had encouraged lower courts
to draw negative inferences 08 from mandatory language in the text of
prison regulations. 109 Although the Court recognized the logic of such
inferences, it questioned whether this approach was sensible "in the
case of a prison regulation primarily designed to guide correctional
officials in the administration of a prison."110 Moreover, this "nega-
tive implication jurisprudence" often results in procedural protections






106. Id. at 2299.
107. Id.
108. "If A then B" also became "if not A, then not B."





The Court then identified two undesirable effects from the Hewitt
approach: "First, it creates disincentives for States to codify prison
management procedures in the interest of uniform treatment.... Sec-
ond, [it] has led to the involvement of federal courts in the day-to-day
management of prisons, often squandering judicial resources with lit-
tle offsetting benefit to anyone."11
2
The Court reasoned that prison guidelines are not only estab-
lished to benefit the prisoner, but are necessary "to instruct
subordinate employees" and "to confine the authority of prison per-
sonnel." 113 However, the Court concluded that the Hewitt approach
"discourages this desirable development." 1 4 Moreover, the result of
judicial involvement in day-to-day management conflicts with the no-
tion that prison administrators ought to be awarded "deference" and
"flexibility" in order to fine-tune the "ordinary incidents of prison
life.""l5
In light of these factors, the Court concluded that "the search for
a negative implication from mandatory language in prisoner regula-
tions has strayed from the real concerns undergirding the liberty pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause.""116 Accordingly, it called for a
"return to the due process principles ... established and applied in
Wolff and Meachum."1 7 The Court recognized that states may create
liberty interests entitled to protection under the Due Process
Clause." 8 However, "these interests will be generally limited to free-
dom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an
unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process
Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant
hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
life."119
Conner, relying on Bell v. Wolfish' 20 and Ingraham v. Wright,'21
argued that "any state action taken for a punitive reason encroaches
upon a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause even in the ab-




115. Id. at 2299-2300.
116. Id. at 2300.
117. Id
118. See id.
119. Id. (citations omitted).
120. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
121. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
122. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2300.
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for this proposition in either Bell or Ingraham. In Bell, the Court
ruled that the punishment of a pretrial detainee prior to an adjudica-
tion of guilt was an "impermissible punishment," violative of due pro-
cess of law, and distinguished it from "permissible regulation" of a
pretrial detainee. 123 The Sandin Court noted that "[s]uch a course
would improperly extend the legitimate reasons for which such per-
sons are detained-to ensure their presence at trial."'1 24 Similarly, the
Ingraham Court concluded that school children were sheltered from
arbitrary corporal punishment from the state by the Due Process
Clause.125 It noted that the Due Process Clause "historically encom-
passed the notion that the state could not 'physically punish an indi-
vidual except in accordance with due process of law."126 The Sandin
Court highlighted the danger if such a course of punishment were al-
lowed: "Although children sent to public school are lawfully confined
to the classroom, arbitrary corporal punishment represents an inva-
sion of personal security to which their parents do not consent when
entrusting the educational mission to the State."'127
The Sandin Court, however, reasoned that the aim of punishing
incarcerated prisoners-to effectuate prison management and pris-
oner rehabilitative goals-differed greatly from the aims found invalid
in Bell and Wolfish. 28 It found that the incarceration of prisoners
"does not impose retribution in lieu of a valid conviction, nor does it
maintain physical control over free citizens forced by law to subject
themselves to state control over the educational mission."'1 29 There-
fore, the Court concluded that the punishment of incarcerated prison-
ers by prison officials "in response to a wide range of misconduct falls
within the expected parameters of the sentence imposed by a court of
law.'13
0
The Court then turned to the specific facts involving prisoner
Conner. It held that the segregated confinement imposed on Conner
by prison administrators "did not present the type of atypical, signifi-
cant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty
123. 441 U.S. at 535.
124. 115 S. Ct. at 2300.
125. 430 U.S. at 674.
126. Id.
127. 115 S. Ct. at 2301.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Court acknowledged that "prisoners do not shed all
constitutional rights at the prison gate," but pointed out that "lawful incarceration" often results
in the withdrawal or limitation of certain rights and privileges. Id.
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interest.' 131 The Court found no substantive difference between the
conditions of disciplinary segregation and the conditions of adminis-
trative segregation and protected custody.132 Additionally, the Court
noted that the State expunged Conner's "high misconduct" charge
from his record nine months after serving time in segregation.
133
Therefore, the Court concluded that since "Conner's confinement did
not exceed similar, but totally discretionary confinement in either du-
ration or degree of restriction," the segregated confinement "did not
work a major disruption in his environment."' 34
Moreover, the Court rejected the notion that the State's action
affected the duration of Conner's sentence. 35 Thus, the Court held
that neither the Due Process Clause nor the Hawaii prison regulation
"afforded Conner a protected liberty interest that would entitle him to
procedural protections set forth in Wolff.'
'1 3 6
2. The Dissenting Opinions
Justice Ginsburg's dissent, joined by Justice Stevens, highlighted
the "anomaly" that results from deriving protected liberty interests
from mandatory language in local prison codes: A state that highly
regulates its prison system may be susceptible to constitutional claims,
whereas a state that has very little regulation may not be susceptible
at all. 137 Therefore, Justice Ginsburg concluded that the due process
"should not depend on the particularities of the local prison's
code."'1 38 Instead, Justice Ginsburg identified the "basic, universal re-
quirements" of due process: (1) notice to the prisoner of the acts of
misconduct that the prison officials allege the prisoner committed; and
(2) an opportunity for the prisoner to respond to the charges before a
decision-maker. 139 Unlike the majority and Justice Breyer, Justice
Ginsburg would not look to state law as a source of constitutionally
protected liberty.
131. Id.
132. See id. ("The record shows that, at the time of Conner's punishment, disciplinary segre-
gation, with insignificant exceptions, mirrored those conditions imposed upon inmates in admin-
istrative segregation and protective custody.").
133. See id.
134. Id.
135. See id. at 2302.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 2303 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). "Liberty that may vary from Ossining, New
York, to San Quentin, California, does not resemble the 'Liberty' enshrined among 'unalienable





Justice Breyer's dissent, joined by Justice Souter, urged that the
majority's reasoning, read in light of the Court's precedent, leads to
the conclusion that Conner's punishment deprived him of "liberty"
within the terms of the Due Process Clause. 140 Breyer specifically re-
lied on two "general pre-existing principles" to reach his conclu-
sion.141 First, "certain changes in conditions may be so severe or so
different from ordinary conditions of confinement" that minimum re-
quirements of due process must be provided, regardless of "whether
or not state law gives state authorities broad discretionary power to
impose them."' 42 Second, "deprivations that are less severe or more
closely related to the original terms of confinement.., will amount to
deprivations of procedurally protected liberty," as long as state law
limits the power of the prison administrators to impose the depriva-
tion.' 43 Applying these principles to Conner's situation, Justice
Breyer concluded that Conner's punishment "worked a fairly major
change in Conner's conditions" and that "the prison's own disciplinary
rules severely cabin the authority of prison officials to impose this
kind of punishment."'"1 Thus, Conner's punishment clearly deprived
him of procedurally protected liberty.
Justice Breyer then attacked the majority's imposition of a mini-
mum standard for defining a procedurally-protected liberty interest. 145
Specifically, he noted that if the standard was meant to radically
change prior law, "its generality threatens the law with uncer-
tainty."'1 46 In contrast, Justice Breyer explained that neither a "radical
reading" of the Court's opinion nor a "significant change" to present
law was required in order to achieve the majority's objective-to read
the Due Process Clause as a protection "against deprivations of free-
dom that are important, not comparatively insignificant."' 47 Instead,
140. See id. at 2304 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
141. See id. at 2305 ("If we apply these general pre-existing principles to the relevant facts
before us, it seems fairly clear.., that the prison punishment here at issue deprived Conner of
constitutionally protected 'liberty.'").
142. Id. at 2304. Specifically, Justice Breyer relied on Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980), and
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990), for support. See Sandin, 115 S. CL at 2304-05
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
143. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2305 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
144. Id.
145. See id. at 2306. Justice Breyer cited two reasons for the majority's definition of a mini-
mum standard for a protected liberty interest: (1) the present standard ("cabining of discretion")
has provided procedural protection for "trivial" rights; and (2) the present standard involves the
courts in matters of prison administration. See id.
146. Id. In particular, some courts may read the new standard as "offering significantly less
protection against deprivation of liberty," whereas others may read it as extending to situations




Justice Breyer offered that all that was required was "elaborating, and
explaining, the Court's present standards" to the lower courts in order
to clarify that the standards must be applied "in light of the purposes
they were meant to serve."' 4
In support of his contention that a major revision of current doc-
trine was unnecessary "to remove minor prison matters from fed-
eral-court scrutiny," Justice Breyer pointed to three sets of
considerations.1 49 First, he noted that although "some deprivations of
an inmate's freedom are so severe in kind or degree that they
amount to deprivations of liberty, irrespective of whether state law (or
prison rules) 'cabin discretion,' it is not easy to specify just when, or
how much of, a loss triggers this protection."' 50 As a result, a middle
category of imposed restraints or deprivations exists that falls neither
obviously within nor obviously without the Due Process Clause's
protection. 151
Second, Breyer explained that the Court "developed its addi-
tional liberty-defining standard," i.e., cabined discretion, because of
the "difficult line-drawing task that this middle category implies."'1 52
He contrasted this approach with the way in which the Court deter-
mines the existence of "property" for Due Process Clause purposes. 153
When the Due Process Clause protects liberty, it protects "an absence
of government restraint" called freedom, not reliance upon an "enti-
tlement" that state law created.15 Moreover, he noted that the prison
context provides "other important reasons ... to consider the provi-
sions of state law."' 55 As a result, Justice Breyer concluded that
"cabined discretion" could be used by the courts to aid in identifying
those restraints that require constitutionally-guaranteed procedural
protection. 56
Third, Justice Breyer reasoned that there is no need to apply the
"discretion-cabining" approach when a deprivation is so unimportant
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. (citations omitted).
151. See id.
152. Id. at 2306-07. As explained, this standard looks to local law and determines whether
the local law creates a "liberty interest" by significantly limiting the discretion of the authorities
to impose a restraint on that interest. See id.
153. See id. at 2307. Under this "property" approach, the Due Process Clause aims to pro-






that it clearly falls outside of the middle category of restraints. 157 He
concluded that the Court had never held that unimportant prisoner
deprivations fall within the scope of the Due Process Clause, even if a
prison regulation limited a prison administrator's authority to impose
a minor deprivation. 158 Justice Breyer then called on the Court to
"simply specify" this point.' 59
Justice Breyer noted the problems that the majority identified,
i.e., procedural protection for trivial rights as a result of using the
"cabining of discretion" standard and the involvement of the courts in
the routine matters of prison administration.160 As a result, he agreed
that the Court "should make explicit the lower definitional limit [of
liberty] in the prison context" under the Due Process Clause.' 6' How-
ever, he believed that the lower definitional limit was implicit in the
Court's precedent and that the abandonment of this precedent was
unnecessary. 62
III. ANALYSIS
The Sandin Court reconfigured the analysis a court is to use for
determining when a prisoner has a protected liberty interest entitled
to procedural protection under the Due Process Clause. This new
standard replaced the approach developed in Hewitt-an approach
"that in practice [was] difficult to administer and which produce[d]
anomalous results."'1 63 Particularly, the Court focused on the undesir-
able results of the Hewitt approach: (1) "disincentives for States to
codify prison management procedures in the interest of uniform treat-
ment"; and (2) "involvement of federal courts in the day-to-day man-
agement of prisons."' 64 However, a close reading of the Sandin
opinion and the underlying case law leads to the conclusion that the
Court only replaced one set of problems with another. Moreover, one
157. See id.
158. See id. at 2307-08.
159. See id. at 2308. Justice Breyer recognized that the courts would be left with the task of
separating the "unimportant" from the "potentially significant" without the aid of the objective
"discretion-cabining" test. See id. However, he compared this task of judicial judgment to, and
concluded that it was no more difficult than, other judicial tasks. See iU For example, he be-
lieved it was possible for a court to separate "television privileges, 'sack' versus 'tray' lunches,
playing the state lottery, attending an ex-stepfather's funeral, or the limits of travel when on




163. Id. at 2300 n.5 (Rehnquist, C.J.).
164. Id. at 2299.
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of the apparent purposes of the Sandin opinion-the reduction of friv-
olous prisoner litigation-may not be realized. 165
In Sandin, the Court specifically called for a return to the due
process principles "correctly established and applied in Wolff and
Meachum."'1 66 However, the Court seemed to rely upon only one
principle from Wolff-the state's ability to create liberty interests pro-
tected under the Due Process Clause' 67 -and did not rely upon
Meachum at all. Since the Sandin Court failed to cite to any portion
of Meachum in support of this proposition, it is unclear from the opin-
ion what principle the Court wished to return to in Meachum. More-
over, Wolff and Meachum represent different approaches to the
development of prisoner liberty interests. Therefore, the Court's reli-
ance on these cases for the foundation of its new standard is confusing
and troubling.
Wolff represented the highpoint of the application of the Court's
"mutual accomodation approach" to prisoner procedural due process
claims. 168 Under this approach, "there must be mutual accomodation
between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the
Constitution that are of general application."'1 69 The Court explained
that lawful imprisonment does not extinguish a prisoner's due process
rights. While a prisoner's rights "may be diminished by the needs and
exigencies of the institutional environment, a prisoner is not wholly
stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for a
crime. ' 170 The Court noted, however, that a prisoner's rights are not
subject to restrictions imposed by the nature of the regime to which
they have been lawfully committed.17' Prison disciplinary proceedings
are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights
due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply. 172
Meachum, on the other hand, severely curtailed the development
of a new liberty interest for prisoners. 173 The Court adopted a narrow
view of entitlement analysis when it evaluated whether the freedom
from interprison transfer was a liberty interest that was protected
165. See Temple v. Dahm, 905 F. Supp. 670, 674 n.8 (D. Neb. 1995).
166. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2300.
167. See id. ("Following Wolff, we recognize that States may under certain circumstances
create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause.").
168. See Bell, supra note 4, at 168.
169. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).
170. Id. at 555.
171. See id. at 556.
172. See id
173. See Bell, supra note 4, at 174.
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under the Due Process Clause.174 The constricted entitlement view of
Meachum, "if followed to its extreme, would allow the state to pass a
law granting some benefit while explicitly disapproving the extension
of procedural protections when a benefit is deprived.'
75
While Wolff represented perhaps the broadest approach to liberty
interests in the prison context, Meachum and its progeny commenced
a restrictive approach to those interests that culminated in Sandin.
The Court's call for a return to the principles of these two cases is
therefore confusing and provides little guidance for lower courts as
they attempt to interpret and apply the new Sandin standard.
In addition to the conflicting case law that underlies the opinion,
the actual language of the Sandin standard is amorphous and ambigu-
ous. The Sandin standard provides that state-created liberty interests
protected under the Due Process Clause
will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not
exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise
to protection by the Due Process Clasue of its own force, nonethe-
less imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in rela-
tion to the ordinary incidents of prison life. 176
Under this standard, a court must determine whether the deprivation
suffered by the prisoner imposes "atypical and significant hardship in
relation to ordinary incidents of prison life." The Court failed to pro-
vide any definitions for "atypical" and "significant." Furthermore, the
Court failed to define "ordinary incidents of prison life." Instead of
clarifying which state-created liberty interests gain procedural protec-
tion, this standard creates more questions than answers.
In order for a court to decide whether a deprivation is "atypical"
or "significant," the court must initially determine "ordinary incidents
of prison life." An objective basis for "ordinary incidents of prison
life" likely leads to a different conclusion than a subjective basis. An
objective basis views prison life from the perspective of a "reasonable
inmate," whereas a subjective approach considers the subjective inter-
pretations of each individual inmate.
For example, in Sandin, the Court compared Conner's segrega-
tion to administrative and protective segregation. 77 However, the
Court declined to state whether "ordinary incidents of prison life" in-
cluded conditions of the general population. If a court did include
174. See Sargentich, supra note 6, at 415.
175. Id. at 416-17.
176. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2300 (citations omitted).
177. See id. at 2301.
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conditions of the general population in its analysis and a majority of
the prisoners interacted with the general population, then an "ordi-
nary incident of prison life" would include interaction with the general
population. 178 Accordingly, disciplinary segregation for an extended
period of time could be classified as an "atypical hardship" and could
not be imposed without due process. Clearly, this conclusion differs
greatly from that reached in Sandin.
Judge Shadur highlighted this shortcoming of the Sandin standard
in his opinion in Leslie v. Doyle.179 He noted that the Sandin Court
chose to compare prisoners in disciplinary segregation with those in
administrative segregation or protective custody, rather than with
prisoners in the general population. 80 Relying on his experience with
the Illinois prison system, he then contrasted the liberty afforded to
segregated inmates and the liberty afforded to those in the general
population: spending twenty-three hours a day in one's cell versus
spending many daylight hours utilizing the prison's facilities; eating
one's meals alone versus dining in the communal dining hall; and be-
ing personally attended by correction officers for any limited move-
ment that is permitted within the institution versus being free from
such attendance. 81 Judge Shadur concluded that
the irony lies in the fact that the [Sandin] opinion makes its main
comparison.., between disciplinary segregation and administrative
custody, a status in which the existence of such constraints is at best
a necessary evil forced by the need to insulate such inmates from
perceived threats to their safety that would be entailed if they were
part of the general population. [T]his Court believes that the record
... has spawned a false premise-and that false premise has in turn
led to the false conclusion that disciplinary segregative status does
not impose a meaningful impairment and therefore does not impli-
cate the deprivation of a liberty interest.182
This opinion by Judge Shadur clearly demonstrates a major short-
coming of the Sandin standard. The outcome of a particular case will
depend on what the lower court decides is an "ordinary incident of
prison life." Lacking guidance from the Sandin opinion, courts will
likely develop different approaches. This result strays "from the real
concerns undergirding the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause" as much as the Hewitt standard did.
178. See Thomas v. Newkirk, 905 F. Supp 580, 583 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
179. No. 93 C 7513, 1995 WL 475891 (N.D. Ill. August 10, 1995).





The reduction of frivolous prisoner litigation-an apparent objec-
tive of the Sandin Court-may not be realized 183 As the court in
Temple v. Dahm explained, a practical result of Sandin is that "fewer
seemingly frivolous prisoner lawsuits will be summarily dismissed."'
184
Prior to Sandin, a prisoner needed to demonstrate that a state law or
regulation created a protectable liberty interest. Failure to produce a
state law or regulation resulted in a dismissal of the case. After
Sandin, a prisoner need only allege that an "atypical" and "signifi-
cant" deprivation has occurred. 185 The prisoner "has been spared the
burden of 'comb[ing] [prison] regulations in search of mandatory lan-
guage on which to base entitlements of state-conferred privileges.' 1
86
Accordingly, a written record will likely be necessary to determine the
existence of a liberty interest and this will surely extend the time
before a case can be dismissed as frivolous.187
Thus, the Sandin standard presents significant problems when
lower courts try to apply it. The Court had hoped to remove the sub-
jectivity created by the Hewitt standard, but the Sandin standard is no
better. It depends heavily on what the reviewing court considers an
"ordinary incident of prison life" and how that court defines "atypical
and significant hardship."
CONCLUSION
The new standard set forth by the Court for determining whether
a liberty interest exists in a prison setting is fraught with ambiguity.
Lower courts will struggle with the definitions of "significant" and
"atypical," as well as "ordinary incidents of prison life." As a result,
the Sandin Court's objective of reducing the amount of prisoners'
rights litigation within the federal courts will not likely be met. Even
more troubling is the new standard, which leaves little chance that
183. See Temple v. Dahm, 905 F. Supp. 670, 674 n.8 (D. Neb. 1995).
184. Id. The court in McKinney v. Hanks, 911 F. Supp. 359 (N.D. Ind. 1995), agreed that the
Sandin standard would not result in a decreased workload for the federal judiciary.
Thus, in the spectrum of prison disciplinary cases and the determination of the presence
of protectable liberty interests for inmates, the task of determining where these new
fences are now located will fall to the United States district judges and United States
magistrate judges, leaving to higher authority the decision as to where and when to
build and tear down these new fences down [sic] in the future. Whatever else may be
said with regard to the Sandin majority, it will not take a Brandeis brief to establish that
the real workload of the federal trial judiciary will be greatly increased as the result of
the Sandin decision, although clearly such was not the intent or purpose of its majority.
Id. at 361.
185. See Temple, 905 F. Supp. at 674 n.8.
186. Id.
187. Seeki.
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